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Abstract 
When considering the validity of international criminal tribunals, focus is typically and 
appropriately upon areas of substantive law and procedure and questions of prosecutorial 
policy. However, to the extent that it is within the capacity of judges to address and resolve 
challenges to the validity of the institution, in order for judges to formulate and implement 
effective solutions to those challenges it is imperative that an institutional culture is cultivated 
that is conducive to those ends. This paper explains the relationship between judicial culture 
and institutional legitimacy, and highlights how recent jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) suggests that there is a need for the adoption and implementation of 
measures to promote the development of a robust institutional culture conducive to resolving 
the challenges faced by the ICC. 
1. Introduction 
Different factors – legal, political, moral and philosophical – may give cause to question the 
validity of the ICC and the international criminal justice enterprise. Other contributors to this 
collection address many of those. Some fall – to varying degrees – within the capacity of ICC 
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judges to address, while some are beyond their remit. To the extent that it is within the capacity 
of ICC judges to address a given issue, in order to do so effectively and efficiently it is 
imperative that ICC judges develop an institutional culture conducive to that end. One such 
culture is that of collegiality.1 This paper outlines the meaning and significance of the concept 
of collegiality before focusing upon two issues that have been recently addressed by ICC judges 
that have implications for the Court’s validity. It will focus upon three decisions of the ICC 
Chambers: the judgment of Trial Chamber II in Katanga,2 the judgment of the Appeals 
Chamber in Ngudjolo Chui,3 and, most recently, the decision of Trial Chamber VA in Ruto and 
Sang.4  The issue raised and addressed by the judgments in the former two cases concern 
fundamental methodological questions of fact-finding and the development of an effective and 
efficient procedural regime, the determination of which goes to the core of the essential purpose 
of the trial. The latter judgment – in Ruto and Sang – touches upon the core issue of how ICC 
judges can and should use their powers in order to respond to external challenges to the 
institution’s legitimacy and actions of third parties designed to frustrate the judicial process. 
All of these decisions are characterised by certain weaknesses of form and substance that may 
be indicative (and a consequence) of dysfunction in the culture of collegiality among ICC 
judges. Further research is required in order to determine whether this recent jurisprudence is 
evidence of isolated instances of weaknesses in collegiality or whether it is evidence of a 
chronic cultural problem. Indeed, the majority of the ICC’s decisions and judgments do not 
give any cause to question the extent of collegiality among judges. Nevertheless at a minimum, 
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the particular decisions highlight the relationship between the internal institutional culture and 
the institution’s external legitimacy, and through them, we can see how defects in the strength 
of collegiality can have negative consequences upon the validity of the institution. 
It may be expected that, having identified a (potential) problem, recommendations or 
suggestions concerning how to address that problem will follow. While it may be possible to 
look to other judicial institutions to identify examples of best practice from which the ICC may 
learn as it develops its own culture, caution must be exercised before transplanting those 
practices into the context of the ICC. Thus, this paper argues that the responsibility for 
determining which cultural practices are appropriate for the ICC lies squarely upon judges 
within the institution itself. However, for reasons that are explained, it is imperative that this 
responsibility is discharged if the Court is going to maximise its credibility as a permanent 
authority on the international legal and political landscape. 
2. Institutional Culture: Collegiality 
For the purposes of this analysis, ‘culture’ consists of the values and norms, practices, attitudes 
and opinions ‘that are meaningful to a group of people … and which allows them to carry out 
their collective lives in relative order and harmony’.5 Thus, culture can have both behavioural 
and ‘ideational’ aspects; it can include formal practices, traditions or procedures and it can 
include more substantive values and norms.6 By definition, the specific attributes of the culture 
within any given institution will have a direct impact upon the day-to-day effectiveness and 
efficiency of the activities undertaken therein and pursuant to the overall aims and objectives 
of the institution. 
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One type of culture associated with judicial institutions is that of collegiality. The culture of 
collegiality is manifested in a number of formal and informal ways. Writings on collegiality as 
a normative concept in the judicial context can be split into those that focus on the formal 
principle of collegiality and those that focus on behavioural or ideational notion of collegiality. 
Yet, the adoption of either conception of collegiality is premised upon the same perception that 
processes of decision-making operating within a collegial culture are more legitimate, and thus 
authoritative, than processes governed by other norms. 
The formal manifestation of collegiality is perhaps most associated with Max Weber’s 
‘principle of collegiality’.7 The most relevant of Weber’s 13 variations of collegiality to 
international judicial institutions is ‘functional collegiality’, according to which the acts of a 
non-monocratic authority 
must be carried out only after previous consultation and vote. That is, their acts are subject 
to the rule that a plurality of individuals must cooperate for the act to be valid … This 
cooperation may follow (α) the principle of unanimity or (β) of decision by majority.8 
This definition corresponds with the basic picture of judicial decision-making on multi-
member courts or tribunals where the decision of the institution is taken collectively by two or 
more judges. Whereas Weber’s remarks on collegiality are relatively few and largely confined 
to predicting the general retreat from collegiality in favour of bureaucratization in social and 
political life,9 subsequent social theorists have elaborated upon collegiality, indicating a 
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qualitative dimension to the legitimacy of collegially-structured organisations.10 Thus, Michael 
Waters has defined collegially organised structures as those  
in which there is dominant orientation to a consensus achieved between members of a body 
of experts who are theoretically equal in their levels of expertise but who are specialised 
by areas of expertise.11 
Proponents of this formal conception of collegiality have situated the principle at the heart of 
the administration of justice within some legal systems: citing the adage ‘juge unique, juge 
inique’, they argue that it gives effect to individual rights to a fair trial, and the basic tenets of 
deliberative democracy.12 According to Fabrice Hourquebie, the operation of collegiality in 
this form has institutional functions, which together strengthen the legitimacy and – in turn – 
authority of judicial decisions rendered by collegially organised institutions.13 Hourquebie 
links collegiality with ‘legitimate rationality’; it permits the institutionalisation of deliberation 
that in turn ‘enables the synergy of legitimate skills (what might be called the principle of trust) 
and comprehensive intelligence (the principle of effectiveness)’.14 By facilitating deliberation, 
collegiality ‘offers space, not only for the plurality of views, but for the pluralism of ideas and 
points of views that exist and are part of a functioning democratic order’.15 At the same time, 
collegiality has a moderating effect: the confrontation of opposing views in the course of 
deliberation confines the exercise of power. Individual decision-makers are required to 
cooperate in the search for consensus, which in turn limits the power of any given individual 
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(Eds) La Collégialité, Valeurs et Significations en Droit Public (Bruylant, Brussels, 2012) and generally, Fabrice 
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14 Hourquebie, supra note 13, p.16 translated by the author. 
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participant in the process.16 In sum, collegiality enhances the rationality of decisions reached, 
thereby strengthening their perceived quality and ultimately their legitimacy and that of the 
institution that renders them.17 
As to the specific claims regarding the importance of collegiality to vindicating fair trial rights, 
collegiality has positive effects upon the independence and impartiality of decision-making. 
From the perspective of impartiality, the collegial form of decision-making requires a process 
of deliberation that neutralises the effect of individual partiality by reorienting deliberation 
towards the formation of a general or objective decision of a disembodied institution rather 
than of a collective of individuals.18 By contrast, ‘independence’ is externally oriented and 
concerns the ability of decision-makers to make decisions ‘without any restrictions, improper 
influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter 
or for any reason’.19 Institutionalised collegiality shields decision-makers from pressures from 
external forces.20 At the institutional level, a single judge may be more susceptible to external 
pressures that may improperly influence their decision-making, whereas a collegial body is 
better equipped to withstand any such pressure.21 At the individual level, the principle of 
collegiality safeguards the freedom of individual judges to arrive at a decision on behalf of the 
court or tribunal. It does so by, in essence, distributing or diluting the responsibility severally 
across the members of the court or tribunal for decisions likely to be unpopular or to displease 
rather than placing the responsibility of that decision on the shoulders of a single judge.22 
                                                          
16 Ibid., p.18 translated by the author. 
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Turning to the ‘ideational’ conception of collegiality, the focus here is less upon the formal 
structure of decision-making and more on the substantive quality of the relationship between 
judges within a collegially organised institution. The most well developed articulation of the 
culture of collegiality is found in the context of the US legal system. Here, Frank Coffin, a 
former US Federal Judge defined collegiality as 
[t]he deliberately cultivated attitude among judges of equal status and sometimes widely 
differing views working in intimate, continuing, open and noncompetitive relationship with 
one another, which manifests respect for the strengths of others restrains one’s pride of 
authorship, which respecting one’s own deepest convictions, values patience in 
understanding and compromise in nonessentials, and seeks as much excellence in the 
court’s decision as the combined talents, experience, insight, and energy of the judges 
permit. 23 
Another similar and similarly well-regarded definition of collegiality within the context of the 
US echoes many of these sentiments. Harry Edwards, former Federal Circuit Judge, defined 
collegiality as 
judges hav[ing] a common interest, as members of the judiciary, in getting the law right, 
and that, as a result, we are willing to listen, persuade and be persuaded, all in an 
atmosphere of civility and respect.24  
Accordingly, from a collective or institutional perspective the culture of collegiality may be 
encapsulated by the notion of an esprit d’ corp. Owing to the shared commitment to ‘getting it 
right’, the culture of collegiality requires – not only tolerates – lively, tolerant, and thoughtful 
debate, described by one Federal Circuit Judge as ‘comfortable controversy’.25 Like the formal 
                                                          
23 Frank Coffin, On Appeal: Courts, Lawyering, and Judging (W.W. Norton, London, 1994), p.215. 
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Review (2003) 1639, p.1645. 
25 Deanell Tacha,’The “C” Word: On Collegiality’ 56 Ohio State Law Journal (1995) 585, p.587. 
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conception of collegiality, this conception of collegiality has implications for the quality and 
legitimacy of decision-making by the collegial body. Edwards described collegiality as a 
synergistic force that enables individual judges on a multi-judge panel to come together and to 
arrive at a decision that is of ‘greater value’ than any one of their individual ‘predilictions in 
decision making’.26 When present a culture of collegiality ‘helps to create the conditions for 
principled agreement, by allowing all points of view to be aired and considered’.27 
Thus, the rationale for the cultivation of a culture of collegiality is clear. Theoretically it is 
perceived to have a positive impact upon the legitimacy of a judicial institution. For the 
purposes of this paper, legitimacy can be described as the ‘acceptance of a body by its 
constituency’.28 As explained by Antonio Cassese, acceptance of an institution is important 
because with it, it ‘may obtain respect for, and compliance with, its commands without resort 
to force’.29 Owing to the decentralised nature of international law, the juridical power of 
international courts and tribunals (the ‘capacity to administer and enact the rules of procedure 
and norms and the motivational intent to secure and preserve the governing values, principles, 
and norms of the societal order’)30 is dependent upon cooperation by dominant actors (typically 
states, but increasingly non-state actors) and their perceived legitimacy.31 There are a variety 
of different bases for acceptance, and thus legitimacy, and collegiality as described in this 
section affects the acceptance of the institution and its decisions in a number of ways. The form 
of collegial decision-making – that is, that it requires the participation of multiple decision 
makers in the deliberative and decision-making process – can strengthen the representational 
legitimacy of the institution and the due-process legitimacy of the institution (by promoting the 
                                                          
26 Edwards, supra note 24, pp.1639-1940. 
27 Ibid., p.1645. 
28 Antonio Cassese, ‘The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals and the Current Prospects of 
International Criminal Justice’ 25 Leiden Journal of International Law (2012) 491, p.492. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Steven Roach, Politicizing the International Criminal Court: The Convergence of Politics, Ethics, and Law 
(Rowman and Littlefield, Maryland, 2006), p.3. 
31 Ibid., p.3. 
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independence and impartiality of decision-making). However, as explained in this section, the 
impact of collegiality is not limited to formal grounds for legitimacy: both the principle of 
collegiality and the ideational or behavioural conception of collegiality have positive effects 
upon the substantive quality of judicial decision-making and judicial reasoning that is the 
outcome of the process. 
To conclude this section, it can be said that the cultivation of a culture of collegiality within 
the judicial chambers of the ICC is one way in which the Court’s judges can enhance the 
likelihood that both the Court as an institution and its individual decisions are accepted as 
legitimate. The following section will first consider the extent to which the existence of 
collegiality is evident, and second will highlight how the jurisprudence of the Court can give 
reason to question the strength of collegiality. In the course of doing so, it will explain how 
these particular instances demonstrate the manner in which weaknesses in collegiality can 
undermine the legitimacy of particular decisions and, if left unchecked, the legitimacy of the 
institution. The examples selected are particularly relevant since the issues addressed or raised 
by the decisions have been such that, on their own terms, challenge the validity of the 
institution. 
3. Collegiality at the ICC: Cause for Concern? 
3.1. Formal Collegiality 
Collegiality is evident in the structure of judicial decision-making authority as established by 
the Rome Statute. ICC judges are divided into three divisions, each dealing with different 
stages of the judicial process. Within each division, situations and cases are distributed among 
‘chambers’ of judges comprised of either three judges (Pre-Trial and Trial divisions) or five 
judges (Appeals Chamber). Article 74 requires Trial Chamber decision-making to be 
undertaken after deliberation, and decisions of chambers are reached by the taking of votes. 
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However, as in the context of the Pre-Trial Chamber, decision-making authority can – in regard 
to some types of decisions – be delegated to a single judge acting on behalf of the Chamber.32 
Recalling Waters’ additional characteristics of collegial decision-making bodies, the 
composition of the ICC is, in principle, based upon expertise.33 However, the ICC Statute – 
like that of other international dispute settlement bodies – adopts a laissez faire approach to 
stipulating the level of experience and what constitutes ‘expertise’, deferring to the 
qualifications for high judicial office required by the national jurisdiction of origin of each 
judge.34 In turn, this provides for a high degree of variance in the professional backgrounds of 
judges. Like that of other international courts and tribunals, the ICC Statute stipulates that the 
composition of the Court should be representative of the principal legal systems of the world,35 
with the ICC Statute further requiring an equitable geographical distribution of judges and that 
the Court’s composition reflects a fair gender balance.36 These criteria for selection must be 
complied with in addition to the qualification criteria. However, in practice the cumulative 
effect of all these factors along with the politicised process of selecting judges means the level 
of experience and expertise of ICC judges as appointed is variable, and the impact of these 
factors upon the quality of the judiciary has been the subject of concern.37 
                                                          
32 Article 39(2)(ii) ICC Statute and Rule 7, RPE. 
33 Article 36(3)(b) ICC Statute and see, for example, Article 2 ICJ Statute; Article 36 ICC Statute; Article 
13bis(1)(c) ICTY Statute; Article 17(3) ‘Understanding on rules and procedure governing settlement of disputes’, 
Annex 2, WTO Agreement.  
34 Article 2 ICJ Statute, Article 13 ICTY Statute, Article 17(3) WTO DSU. 
35 Article 9 ICJ Statute, Article 13bis(1)(c) ICTY Statute. Article 36(8)(a)(i) ICC Statute. 
36 Article 36(8)(a)(ii) and (iii) ICC Statute. 
37 An issue afflicting all international courts and tribunals: Ruth Mackenzie, Cesare Romano and Philippe Sands, 
Selecting International Judges: Principle, Process and Politics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), p.51 and 
pp.110-120; Gideon Boas, ‘The Case for a New Appellate Jurisdiction for International Criminal Law’ in Göran 
Sluiter and Sergey Vasiliev (Eds) International Criminal Procedure: Towards a Coherent Body of Law (Cameron 
May, London, 2009), pp.450-451; Peter Murphy and Lina Baddour, ‘Evidence and Selection of Judges in 
International Criminal Tribunals: The Need for a Harmonized Approach’ in Elies Van Sliedregt and Sergey 
Vasiliev (Eds) Pluralism in International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015), pp.368-369 and 
Jonathan O’Donohue, ‘The ICC and the ASP’ in Carsten Stahn (Ed) The Law and Practice of the International 
Criminal Court (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015), pp.127-129. 
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While the appropriateness of these diversity requirements is not questioned, their implications 
for the strength of behavioural collegiality among judges need to be acknowledged. At the very 
least, such diversity creates a need for concerted practices and policies designed to inculcate 
behavioural collegiality to overcome the differences between judges. At the same time, as 
Section 4 will explain, those differences can themselves limit the range of appropriate policies 
likely to be effective in promoting behavioural collegiality that are available to the ICC. For 
now, however, it suffices to note that formally speaking the composition of the ICC possesses 
the foremost qualities of collegial authority when delegated to a multi-member organisation. 
3.2. Behavioural Collegiality 
From an external perspective, it is difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the strength of the 
ideational conception of collegiality within an institution, particularly within those institutions 
where internal deliberations are cloaked, quite appropriately, by the secrecy of deliberations.38 
Despite this, one method of appraising the strength of the culture of collegiality within the ICC 
is to reflect upon judicial discourse in the public sphere, that is, as manifested in the published 
decisions and opinions of the Court’s Chambers and individual judges. Collegial decision-
making does not require a unanimous outcome to the process of deliberation such that 
disagreement between judges – manifested in both the vote and the existence of any dissenting 
or separate opinions – is not inconsistent per se with collegiality. However, the nature of those 
decisions and opinions, as the following will demonstrate, may betray defects in the integrity 
of the collegial culture. The following sections will discuss three examples where weaknesses 
in the Court’s decision could have been avoided had collegiality been a more dominant culture 
in the decision-making context in which those decisions had been made. Even if the examples 
highlighted in this paper are isolated, if allowed to go unchecked such that collegial dysfunction 
                                                          
38 Principle 15, UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra note 19. 
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becomes the norm, this could have more serious – and direct – implications for institutional 
legitimacy. 
3.2.1. Ruto and Sang: ‘No Case to Answer’ Decision 
This first example of judicial practice not only demonstrates the manner in which judicial 
decisions can evidence shortfalls in ideational collegiality but can also suggest defects in the 
operation of the formal collegial process. In April 2016, Trial Chamber V(A) issued a decision 
at the request of the defence determining whether – owing to the gradual collapse in the 
Prosecution case due to ongoing difficulties in securing documentary evidence and witness 
testimony – the proceedings against defendants Samuel Ruto and Joshua Sang should be 
terminated.39 The decision was the latest in of six years’ worth of investigations and 
proceedings into the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya; proceedings that were shrouded in 
intense political and legal controversy that tested the relationship between the ICC and African 
Union states to the limits. During this period, actors hostile to the investigation and prosecution 
of the defendants in this case and the other arising out of the Kenya situation (namely, that 
against Uhuru Kenyatta, now President of Kenya) engaged in witness intimidation and bribery. 
Thus, irrespective of the standpoint adopted – whether in favour of the Court’s proceedings in 
the Kenya situation or against – the credibility of the Court was at this point under considerable 
pressure. Faced with this, from the perspective of preserving what was left of judicial and 
institutional validity in respect of the Kenya situation, the conviction with which the Chamber 
addressed the issue before it was of great importance. 
The Chamber decided, by majority, that based on the remaining evidence available there was 
no case for the accused to answer. Thus, it decided to vacate the charges against the accused 
and to discharge the accused.40 However, in an effort to ensure that the door to future 
                                                          
39 Ruto and Sang, supra note 4. 
40 Ruto and Sang, supra note 4, p.1. 
13 
proceedings against the accused in connection to the same situation was not closed, the 
dispositive paragraph included the observation that the discharge of the accused was ‘without 
prejudice to their prosecution in the future’.41 Judge Herrera Carbuccia, dissenting, would have 
rejected the defence request and would have allowed the case proceed to trial.42 
While the Trial Chamber’s decision raised a myriad of substantive and procedural legal issues 
(in addition to the not insignificant matters of policy), the focus in this paper is upon the form 
of the Chamber’s decision and its questionable legitimacy, and what says about the culture out 
of which that particular decision was the outcome. While this focus on form might seem an 
unlikely point of focus in view of the wider significance of the decision, the focus on form is 
to demonstrate precisely why form – even in cases as exceptional as this one – matters. 
The starting point of the analysis is Article 74(5) of the Rome Statute, which states: 
The decision [of the Trial Chamber] shall be in writing and shall contain a full and 
reasoned statement of the Trial Chamber's findings on the evidence and conclusions. The 
Trial Chamber shall issue one decision. When there is no unanimity, the Trial Chamber's 
decision shall contain the views of the majority and the minority. The decision or a 
summary thereof shall be delivered in open court.43 
Thus, for decisions of the Trial Chamber to be legal, there must be a single decision of the 
Chamber that includes the ‘full and reasoned statement’ of the basis for that decision. Contrary 
to this, the impugned Decision consisted of a bare statement outlining the majority conclusion 
– that is, the vacation of the charges and discharge of the accused – with reference to the 
separate opinions of the two judges who supported that conclusion for the reasons supporting 
                                                          
41 Ibid. 
42 Ruto and Sang, supra note 4, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Herrera Carbuccia. 
43 Article 74(5) ICC Statute.  
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that conclusion.44 Furthermore, since those two separate opinions – authored by Judges Eboe-
Osuji and Fremr respectively – offer different bases for their support for the conclusion, and 
with the third judge, Judge Herrera Carbuccia, dissenting from the Chamber’s conclusion, there 
does not appear to be a single decision of the Chamber in accordance with the requirements of 
the Statute. 
The format of the Chamber’s decision may not be quite so objectionable if considered within 
the context of institutions where decisions are rendered in seriatim, that is, as a collection of 
the individual opinions of the judges of the court or chamber from which the ratio decidendi 
of the case is discerned.45 However, this approach is clearly inconsistent with both the plain 
wording of the ICC Statute and the intentions of the drafters as manifested in the wording of 
Article 74(5) who sought to strike a compromise between those who wished to prohibit judges 
from expressing their individual views and those who sought to permit them to do so.46 For 
example, the direction in Article 74(3) that Trial Chamber judges ‘shall attempt to achieve 
unanimity in their decision’, clearly indicates the emphasis placed upon the norm of unanimity 
specifically (rather than the more nebulous norm of consensus).47 Thus there is an expectation 
that the Trial Chamber judges would, even in the absence of unanimity to seek as high a degree 
of agreement as possible. Yet, the bare statement of the Chamber’s conclusion contrasted 
against the three extensively reasoned individual opinions may give the impression of 
otherwise. 
                                                          
44 Ruto and Sang, supra note 4, p.1. 
45 Ruto and Sang, supra note 4, Reasons of Judge Eboe-Osuji, footnote 213. 
46 Otto Triffterer, ‘Article 74: Requirements for the decision’ in O. Triffterer (Ed) Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court – Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (2nd Ed Hart, Oxford, 2008), 
p.1398. 
47 C. Sunstein, ‘Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court’ (2013) Preliminary Draft, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2466057, p.6.  
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Black-letter analysis aside, from both the formal and behavioural perspectives, the decision of 
the Court and the fact of its apparent inability to arrive at any level of consensus upon the legal 
basis for the court’s ultimate disposition suggests a breakdown in the process of deliberation.48 
On one level, it does appear that the procedure of majority decision-making consistent with the 
formal conception of collegiality was followed. Similarly, it is evident – by the fact that each 
judge issued a detailed individual opinion setting out their individual rationale for voting in 
favour or against the disposition – that each individual vote was rationally motivated.49 
However, it cannot be said that the decision of the Chamber represents a rationally motivated 
consensus,50 since the deliberations of the Chamber failed to achieve even a minimum degree 
of consensus upon the basis for its conclusion. Moreover, that each of the judges individually 
wrote extensive opinions but failed to come together to construct any form of reasoned opinion 
for the Chamber suggests a weakness in the sense of common endeavour or esprit d’corps that 
would seem to underpin the impetus towards unanimity and which lies at the heart of the 
cultural conception of collegiality. 
It may be argued that to the extent that there was a breakdown in the collegial culture and 
process with regard to that particular decision, the account of that breakdown presented here is 
exaggerated.51 After all, the opinions of the majority judges reveal that there was a convergence 
in opinion between the judges on a majority of issues: they agreed that on the basis of the 
evidence before them, and owing to the witness interference that had occurred around the case, 
there was no case for the two defendants to answer. Moreover, they both agreed that the charges 
                                                          
48 However, this is not to advocate the creation of a false appearance of consensus through the delivery of per 
curiam decisions and the prohibition of individual opinions as is the case at the Court of Justice of the European 
Union.   
49 Judge Fremr’s ‘Reasons’ ran to 55 pages whereas Judge Eboe-Osuji’s ‘Reasons’ ran to 196 pages. Judge Herrera 
Carbuccia’s Dissenting Opinion ran to 44 pages. 
50 An observation also made by Judge Herrera Carbuccia in dissent. Ruto and Sang, supra note 4, Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Herrera Carbuccia, para.1 (footnote 1). 
51 The author wishes to thank Shezad Charania for raising this point during discussions at the Pluricourts 
conference, referred to in the author’s note at the outset of this paper.  
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against the accused should be vacated and that proceedings against the accused should not 
continue. Even further, both agreed that the door to future investigations and prosecutions of 
the accused in connection to the same events should not be closed. Indeed, the only difference 
between the two judges was the legal characterisation of this conclusion: whereas Judge Eboe-
Osuji argued in favour of declaring a mistrial – a finding unavailable under the Rome Statute 
– Judge Fremr stopped short of declaring a mistrial and instead made recourse to the 
exceptional factual circumstances of the case.52 
However, precisely because there was such a broad level of agreement between the two judges 
in the majority, the fact that they still failed to be able to compose a reasoned judgment of the 
Chamber that represented the extent of their agreement paints an even more troubling picture 
of the health of collegiality – at least within that particular Chamber. Quite simply – and 
unnecessarily – the format of the decision itself unnecessarily exaggerated the degree of 
disagreement between the judges in a moment when a show of solidarity within the Court 
would have been welcome. 
Perhaps this is an isolated incident, attributable to the exigencies of the particular case or the 
relationship between the particular judges in question. However, looking to the future, lessons 
can be learned from this situation. Owing to the very nature of the Court’s mandate, ICC judges 
can expect to deal with ‘hard cases’ that raise challenging issues, legally and politically. In this 
particular instance the substantive outcome of the Chamber’s decision was to the satisfaction 
of those hostile to the Court. But in future cases it is inevitable that decisions will be made that 
will be unpopular among powerful stakeholders in the Court’s activities. In order to have a 
chance at withstanding the external challenges to its legitimacy that this environment brings, it 
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is imperative that the judges are able to, perhaps, put aside their own differences, in the interests 
of the Court’s authority. 
3.2.2. Procedural and Evidential Problem-Solving: Katanga and Ngudjolo 
Whereas the previous example was used to highlight the importance of a strong culture of 
collegiality in order to effectively buttress against political and/or external threats to its 
legitimacy, this section will touch upon the importance of a strong culture of collegiality if the 
Court’s judges are to develop a coherent procedural regime that is effective and efficient. 
Elsewhere in this issue,53 Yvonne McDermott has addressed the different methodological 
approaches to fact-finding and the evaluation of evidence manifested in the jurisprudence of 
both the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals. In particular, she focussed upon the ‘anxiety’ among 
judges with regard to the correct approach towards the evaluation of evidence to be taken as 
manifested in the dissenting and separate opinions of judges.54 She identified two broad schools 
of thought – the ‘atomistic’ and the ‘holistic’ approach to the evaluation of evidence – and the 
approach taken having fundamental consequences for the tribunal’s ultimate conclusion upon 
the individual criminal responsibility of the accused.55 At the ICC, these disagreements have 
manifested themselves in acrimonious exchanges between judges in their individual opinions, 
the two clearest examples being the dissenting opinion of Judge van den Wyngaert from the 
Trial Chamber judgment in Katanga (and the response of Judges Cotte and Diarra in their joint 
separate opinion)56 and the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Tarfusser and Trendafilova from 
the Appeals Chamber judgment in Ngudjolo and Chui.57 From the perspective of collegiality, 
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54 Ibid., p.6. 
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the problem with these opinions does not lie in fact that disagreement was expressed, but rather 
in the manner in which that disagreement was expressed. 
In Ngudjolo, Judges Tarfusser and Trendafilova – coming from the holistic school of thought 
– accused the Trial Chamber in its decision upon which they were hearing the appeal as having 
‘abdicated its paramount responsibility to properly manage the conduct of trial proceedings 
and ensure their fairness’.58 They concluded their opinion with the statement that the majority’s 
‘fragmentary approach towards the evaluation of evidence and speculations on its substance 
create[d] highly alarming precedents in international criminal law capable of compromising 
the integrity of the proceedings and undermine the perception of the victims and the public that 
justice is being delivered’.59 Similarly – but based upon atomistic school of thought on the 
evaluation of evidence – Judge van den Wyngaert describing her disagreement with decision 
of Trial Chamber II as a ‘complete dissent’,60 accused the Chamber in robust language of what 
she characterised as the unfair and ultra vires exercise of judicial power.61 She concluded that 
what she perceived to be a litany of defects in the Chamber’s handling of the case culminated 
to present ‘a case of overwhelming strength against the legality and legitimacy of this 
judgment’.62  
The disagreements between the judges in both Katanga and Ngudjolo arise out of 
fundamentally different conceptions of the role of the judge in criminal proceedings, ultimately 
rooted in differing views of the character and purpose of the criminal trial process. The ICC is 
a sui generis blend of legal traditions, with identifiable traits from both common law and civil 
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law jurisdictions and both inquisitorial and adversarial traditions.63 This blend was intentional 
as well as necessary to secure the adoption of the Statute; the representativeness of different 
legal systems and cultures one basis for the institution’s legitimacy. As such, disagreement 
between judges was a predictable and inevitable consequence of the structure of the Court as 
designed by the drafters of the Rome Statute. Whereas it may have been (and may still be) 
expected that the judges would resolve those contradictions and ambiguities through 
deliberations upon the interpretation of the Statute, the reality has been that the Statute has 
entrenched the divergence of judicial views by lending support for all positions.64 In order to 
transcend the evident disagreement between judges and to develop a coherent procedural and 
evidential regime, whether that regime is defined by a pluralism to accommodate such 
differences, or whether a unified regime is developed, the procedural collegiality manifested 
in the structure and composition of the judicial chambers must be infused with a strong ethos 
of collegiality that governs the interactions between judges on a practical basis. 
3.3. Collegiality and the Language of Disagreement 
The two decisions discussed in the previous subsection highlight another important dimension 
to the relationship between collegiality and institutional legitimacy, as appraised by external 
actors.65 Until now, the focus has been upon the culture of collegiality manifested in one 
particular deliberative sphere, that is, the internal deliberative context. However, when 
individual judges are permitted to publish written opinions alongside the judgment or decision 
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of the court, as is the case in most international courts and tribunals, the court’s decision and 
the opinions attached contribute to an external discursive sphere,66 wherein discourse between 
judges should be consistent with the cultural norm of collegiality. While individual opinions 
are not inherently uncollegial, it is possible for judges to undermine collegiality through the 
manner in which they use their right to issue individual opinions, with implications for judicial 
authority – both that of the institution and the individual judge(s) in question. 
The negative impact of uncollegial behaviour in the form of the content of published individual 
opinions upon the legitimacy and authority of a judicial institution arises out of the fact that it 
is conducted in the public sphere. Criticisms of colleagues (as opposed to the opinions held by 
colleagues) expressed in public not only harm the professional relationship between those 
individual judges in the same way as criticisms expressed in the private sphere, but public 
criticisms also affect how others perceive the judges in question. In turn, this affects how 
external actors appraise the legitimacy,67 and ultimately authority, of the institution and the 
individual judges in question.68 This reasons for this are two-fold. The first is substantive and 
based upon the substantive criticisms and aspersions cast by one colleague against another. 
When a judge accuses a colleague – or even the institution – of exercising their decision-
making authority in an improper manner, such criticisms hold greater persuasive force than 
when those allegations are made by an external actor – for example, an academic, a politician, 
a practitioner.69 
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The second reason is one of form and concerns the language with which individual judges 
communicate their views. In order to understand how uncollegial language can undermine 
judicial authority, it is necessary to appreciate the importance of language to establishing and 
consolidating judicial authority. Scholars of the rhetorical nature of law draw to our attention 
how courts ‘create by performance [their] own character and role and [establish] a community 
with others’.70 They argue that how courts (and by extension, individual judges) say what they 
do matters as much as what they say.71 For example, Peter Goodrich has linked the use of legal 
rhetoric directly to the capacity of courts to induce the ‘cooperation and accommodation of 
social and institutional forces whose real affinities are antagonistic and conflictual’, and thus 
fulfil their dispute resolution function.72 Thus, language is not ‘merely’ cosmetic, but has 
substantive implications. 
In light of this, it becomes easier to appreciate the criticism of the use of particular rhetoric by 
judges when expressing their disagreement with their colleagues. For example, critics of 
dissentient practice by judges of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) appear to be less 
concerned with the revelation of disagreement between the judges of the Court or even the 
substantive nature of that disagreement. Rather their objections focused upon how language 
that ‘attacked’ or was ‘critical of’ the decision of the Court was considered ‘not worthy of 
members of the highest judicial tribunal’ and risked undermining the prestige and dignity of 
the Court.73 Even those judges who have exhibited a favourable attitude towards dissenting and 
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separate opinions have maintained that there is ‘no excuse for intemperateness. It is possible to 
make a protest with vigour and yet with the elegant serenity customary in learned judicial 
discourse’.74 Writing from a domestic law perspective, William Ross has described how 
‘civility is one of the hallmarks of the judicial temperament’ such that judicial incivility is more 
concerning than incivility within other branches of government.75 Going further, in the context 
of the ICJ, it has been suggested that the use of polite and courteous – and ultimately collegial 
– language by judges is an aspect of the qualities of ‘integrity and propriety’ that are implicit 
in the requirement that ICJ judges be ‘persons of high moral character’.76 
With this in mind, we can consider the rhetoric of dissent utilised by the dissenting judges in 
Ngudjolo and Katanga canvassed in Section 3.2.2. This rhetoric may be understood as not only 
a symptom of the breakdown in the collegial process as discussed previously, but as this sub-
section has explained it can also itself be a cause of further deterioration in the collegial culture. 
This sub-section has also explained how the use of such robust language to express 
disagreement can have a direct – and negative – impact upon the perceived legitimacy and, in 
turn, authority of the judicial institution. While the present author would not go so far as to 
stipulate what is or is not appropriate judicial rhetoric in the context of the ICC system, at the 
very minimum it is nevertheless important to acknowledge the consequences of the choice of 
language used by judges. 
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4. Developing Collegiality: Lessons from Elsewhere? 
If a strengthened culture of collegiality at the ICC can enhance the legitimacy of judicial 
decision-making (both as a matter for form and quality), it might be asked what measures ICC 
judges can adopt in order to deepen the culture of collegiality at the ICC. Culture is an 
inherently contextual and complex phenomenon:77 the cultivation of any culture, institutional 
or otherwise, is an organic process that takes time. This does not mean, however that the 
substantive attributes of a culture are beyond the control of actors; policies and practices can 
be undertaken in order to promote the cultivation of a culture with specific attributes. 
Accordingly, it might be considered useful to reflect upon how other judicial institutions – 
faced with similar challenges – have promoted the culture of collegiality, and it might be asked 
whether it is appropriate to ‘transplant’78 any practices and policies adopted by those 
institutions into the ICC context.  
One institution to which it may be tempting to turn for inspiration is the ICJ. Like the ICC, the 
ICJ judiciary is comprised of judges from diverse professional and cultural backgrounds. As 
with the ICC (and perhaps even more so), the political, geographical, professional and 
epistemological diversity of the ICJ judges is lauded as one of its principal legitimising 
attributes.79 The inevitable disagreement between judges that results from these viewpoints is 
manifested in the Court’s jurisprudence, which is characterised by the plurality of opinions that 
invariably accompany the judgment of the Court. Yet, over the course of the ICJ’s 95-year 
history both in its current form and in its previous incarnation as the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, the ICJ has developed certain formal practices designed to cultivate robust 
collegiality. However, the ICJ is not taken to be the perfect example of collegiality in practice. 
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It is certainly likely that divisions and internal politics may affect the nature and outcome of 
internal deliberations at the ICJ and there may well be uncollegial practice. Moreover, as the 
following discussion will explain, the suggestions offered are not without their own difficulties 
if considered from the perspective of the ICC. 
The first policy might be to institute a more formalised process of deliberation and decision-
making; one that supplements that formal conception of collegiality embodied by the Rome 
Statute’s provisions governing the structure of decision-making. At the ICJ, the formal internal 
judicial procedure requires individual judges to produce and circulate written ‘notes’ that 
explain their views on the case at hand once all submissions by the parties have been made and 
preliminary oral deliberations have been undertaken.80 These written notes in turn provide the 
basis of the oral discussions and deliberations, with all judges having had the opportunity to 
read and reflect upon the different judicial views prior to those deliberations.81 The process of 
these oral exchanges is formally structured to encourage full participation by all members of 
the Court,82 with judges required, in reverse order of seniority,83 to present to their colleagues 
their views on the case and to respond to questioning by those colleagues.84 Whereas the note-
writing and circulating process may encourage judges to formulate and entrench their views 
prior to the Court’s deliberations at the ICJ,85 the views of all ICJ judges are subject to 
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examination and critique during the oral deliberations. Once the drafting has commenced the 
process of reading the draft judgment and the circulation and reading of draft additional 
opinions constitutes an ongoing process of deliberation,86 whereby both the Court’s draft 
judgment and the draft opinions are the subject of critical reflection, review and amendment in 
light of each other.87 Thus, there is a rigorous formal procedure designed to require individual 
participation in deliberation, one that is complemented by informal discussions between judges 
as the formal process of the Court’s deliberation and drafting proceeds. 
Deliberative procedure within the international criminal tribunals is markedly different and less 
formally prescribed. While all judges are clearly expected to contribute to deliberations upon 
the cases to which they are assigned, there is no formalised procedure such as that at the ICJ 
compelling it.88 Deliberations are conducted orally or through the exchange of informal notes, 
and once it is clear where the majority (in the absence of unanimity) lies, responsibility for 
drafting the Chamber’s decision is assumed by that majority.89 Whereas at the ICJ, the process 
of deliberation formally commences once all submissions have been made and hearings have 
been conducted, deliberations within the international criminal tribunals – given the length and 
complexity of the cases – is an ongoing process from the commencement of proceedings before 
the given Chamber through to the delivery of the Chamber’s decision.90 
It is for this reason – namely, the sheer length and complexity of cases – that adopting a highly 
formalised approach to deliberation and decision-making such as that at the ICJ would not be 
practicable for the ICC. The length of ICC proceedings is already the subject of significant 
criticism and the adoption of an approach inspired by the ICJ would like hinder the expediency 
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of deliberations. On a practical level, the internal organisational structure (as opposed to the 
sequencing of hearings, deliberations, decision-making and decision-drafting) might make a 
direct transposition of some of the more formalised processes and system of seniority from the 
ICJ to the ICC more difficult. The ICJ sits in plenary and therefore it is easier to enforce and 
reinforce these systems and procedures. By contrast, the Chamber configuration of the ICC 
with judges sitting in parallel to each other inevitably makes this more difficult. However, this 
in itself should not discourage the exploration of other options that may be more appropriate to 
the ICC but which serve a similar purpose. 
A second strategy might be to accentuate the responsibility of the Court’s President for 
overseeing the institution’s operational culture. One former ICJ President has explained the 
manner in which the President can set the tone for decision-making and the prioritisation placed 
upon achieving consensus or unanimity.91 In turn, depending upon the approach, this can 
encourage or discourage the use of additional opinions.92 Again, the ability of the President of 
the Court to enforce a common culture or practice may be easier in an institution such as the 
ICJ where judges sit in a singular plenary configuration, of which the President is always the 
most senior member.93 At the ICC, the multiple divisions and Chambers make it difficult to 
obtain consistency. Yet, if there were to be initiatives at the ICC to enhance collegiality, 
logically it would seem that the Presidency would be the most appropriate organ to drive such 
initiatives.94 
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Another strategy suggested by Göran Sluiter might be that the ICC adopt a document akin to 
the ICJ’s Resolution on Internal Judicial Practice,95 designed to reinforce the formal process of 
deliberation, decision-making and drafting and strengthen the sense of internal collegiality and 
discipline.96 While there is a general disinclination towards the adoption of a judicial codes of 
conduct in the context of international justice which may fuel scepticism as to the utility of 
such a Resolution at the ICJ in the absence of a mechanism of enforcement,97 the process of 
drafting such a resolution may be of utility. Even if unenforceable, an inclusive process of 
drafting will raise the profile of collegiality, and the existence of the resolution may serve to 
remind judges and those working within the institution of the importance of judicial discipline 
and collegiality which might easily be overlooked in the heat of the strong disagreement. 
Finally, one informal mechanism by which to encourage the development of an institutional 
culture is for judges (or former judges) to write about their experiences on the Court extra-
judicially. There is a long tradition of ICJ judges of doing this, both as sitting judges and once 
they have left the Court.98 This practice reinforces the sense of institutional culture and raises 
awareness of it and its importance, both internally and externally. Although judges – both ICJ 
judges and domestic judges – have addressed the subject of collegiality within the institution, 
it is understandable why the matter might be considered a sensitive topic to comment upon. 
Judges who do write about collegiality within their institution are likely to stress what 
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collegiality within that institutional context means, explain why it is important and perhaps 
highlight evidence of best practice. It is unlikely that a judge will explicitly criticise the 
institution or individual colleagues for uncollegial behaviour in public; in many respects that 
in itself would be uncollegial behaviour. However, general accounts that describe the extant 
institutional culture (or at least, the desired institutional culture) are valuable as they can inform 
potential and incoming judges of the existence and importance attached to institutional culture 
and collegiality within the institution that they are joining, thereby contributing to the 
socialisation of newcomers into the institution.99 Once members of the Court, this body of 
literature provides a reminder or guidance of what culture they have joined and with what ethos 
they are expected to discharge their functions. At the same time, in some respects the 
background of ICJ judges is not quite as diverse as that at the ICC. In the most part, ICJ judges 
are familiar with the discipline of international law – whether coming from academic, 
practitioner, or diplomatic (or often a mixture of all three) backgrounds – and are therefore 
more likely to be familiar with the field of literature, having read the same leading journals and 
leading texts, for example.100 By contrast, at the ICC, while some judges may have experience 
in international (criminal) law having served as counsel or as judges in other international 
(criminal) courts and tribunals, others may join the Court after lengthy careers as domestic 
criminal judges or domestic prosecutors. Accordingly, they are unlikely to be familiar with the 
same field of professional and scholarly literature as that of their counterparts, which may limit 
the effectiveness of such writings. 
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David Nelken has cautioned that the success of legal transplants depends on the ‘relationship 
or the “fit” between law and society’ as well as between the transplanted and the extant legal 
system, and the degree to which the transplanted law penetrates society’.101 This section has 
showed that the same can be said when considering legal transplants in the across institutions, 
rather than societies. What may be learned from the ICJ’s practices if policies and practices are 
to be developed, then the primary actors – clearly – must be the judges themselves. As a matter 
of preserving judicial independence and impartiality, judicial autonomy is paramount – 
meaning that measures affecting how judges conduct their deliberations and decision-making 
cannot be dictated or imposed upon judges, such as by the Assembly of States Parties. The 
judges themselves must undertake any initiatives undertaken to the end of strengthening 
collegiality. From a practical perspective, it is those who are closely involved in the process of 
deliberations or decision-making and who are aware of the true culture within the institution 
who can identify the root causes of any weaknesses in the culture of collegiality (to the extent 
that there are any) and to prescribe, based upon their experiences working within the extant 
culture, the solutions most likely to be effective in addressing those issues. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The ICC is a young institution, and the imbedding of an institutional culture takes time. At the 
ICC this is particularly so, where unlike at the ICJ, judges have non-renewable terms of office 
thus hampering the development and retention of institutional memory. Given the age of the 
Court, it would be surprising if there already existed a robust institutional culture – whether 
that is one of collegiality or otherwise. Therefore, to the extent that there is a question-mark 
over the strength of the collegial norm within the ICC as discussed in this article, it can be 
considered not too concerning. Moreover, many of the difficulties faced, or potentially faced, 
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by the ICC are not unique to it: for example, balancing judicial individuality and independence 
with the needs of the institution and overcoming the particular challenges presented when 
dealing with elites such as judges are both issues faced by all judicial systems and institutions. 
However, the fundamental argument remains: while the ICC and its judges continue to grapple 
with the myriad of challenges that it faces as they seek to develop an effective and efficient 
procedural regime within the Court, they should not overlook the importance of – in the course 
of doing so – nurturing the development of a robust collegial culture. 
